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Abstract 
The purpose of this paper is to determine under what circumstances foreign intervention 
exacerbates sectarian conflict. Since the vast majority of academics do not pay heed to the 
argument that sectarian conflict is simply the result of ancient hatreds, economic, political, and 
social factors that result in sectarian conflict must be analyzed. To determine what these factors 
are and how they interplay with intervention and its associated outcomes, this paper will first 
review the appropriate literature on foreign intervention and sectarian conflict and then apply 
relevant theories to three case studies in the Levant covering 1990 to 2014. This paper will 
utilize the theory that sectarian conflict is produced when groups collectively fear for their future, 
which eventually provokes a security dilemma and a conflict spiral. It logically follows that any 
conditions that increase perceptions of fear or exacerbate the security dilemma or conflict spiral 
are the circumstances under which foreign intervention exacerbates sectarian conflict. Ultimately 
this paper concludes that high levels of poverty, preexisting civil conflict, the presence of a 
marginalized sectarian group, and the presence of manipulative leaders in the context of an 
intervention targeting a state’s government are the circumstances under which intervention 
exacerbates sectarian conflict.  
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Introduction 
 In the two decades prior to 2011, there were two US-led military interventions and one 
UN-led sanctions regime targeting Iraq. However, since 2011, there have been at least 11 
military and economic interventions in the region. The outcomes produced by the 2003 invasion 
include the genesis of militant groups that still exist in the region today, a bloody sectarian civil 
war, and ultimately a weak Iraqi state that today is unable and at times unwilling to police its 
borders or protect its population from extremist groups. It remains to be seen if the numerous 
interventions in the Levant in the last several years will produce similar outcomes. However, the 
regionalization of the civil war in Syria, the rise of new extremist groups, and the return of 
widespread sectarian violence to Iraq seems to indicate that similar outcomes are likely.  
This paper will address the future of the Levant by analyzing how and why interventions 
result in, fail to result in, or exacerbate ethnic conflict. More specifically, this paper will 
determine the circumstances under which intervention in the Levant results in or increases 
sectarian conflict1. Several such circumstances are determined by reviewing the academic 
literature on intervention and sectarian conflict, and through an analysis of three Levantine case 
studies. From the literature on intervention, I conclude structural factors such as the target of the 
intervention and the effect of the intervention on state strength can make intervention more likely 
to result in conflict. From the literature on sectarian and ethnic conflict, a general explanation 
regarding the process that creates conflict between rival social groups is produced and several 
economic and social factors that exacerbate this process are identified. These conclusions, as 
                                                          
1
 Sectarian identity is a subset of religious identity which is itself a subset of ethnicity (e.g. Arab Christians and 
Muslims are the same ethnicity, but hold different religious identities). Sunnis and Shias have largely the same 
religious identity, but different sectarian identities. The terms ‘ethnic’ and ‘sectarian’ are used interchangeably in 
this paper because both terms contextually distinguish between separate social groups.   
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well as the utility of the theory on the genesis of sectarian conflict, are tested by analyzing to 
what degree my chosen circumstances explain the outcomes produced in the case studies.  
Ultimately I conclude that the theory on the creation of conflict between rival social 
groups that I glean from the literature can fully explain the outcomes seen in the case studies. 
This allows me to argue that interventions targeting state governments and interventions that 
substantially decrease the target2 state’s capacity to provide services and security are the main 
circumstances that cause intervention to result in sectarian conflict. Additionally, I argue that 
poverty, preexisting civil conflict, the presence of politically relevant sectarian grievances, and 
the presence of manipulative leaders who use sectarian identity and fear of the rival sect to 
maintain power are lesser conditions that if extant in the target state, increase the likelihood of 
sectarian conflict after an intervention by contributing to insecurity and marginalization.  
 
Perspectives on Intervention 
 For the purposes of this paper, intervention is defined as the use of national armed forces, 
coercive economic sanctions, and the transfer of weapons, money, or fighters to influence the 
political, social or economic conditions in a target country. The inclusion of economic 
components takes this definition beyond purely military intervention, and the inclusion of 
transfers of weapons, money, or fighters as a form of intervention allows for atypical 
interventions into irregular wars to be considered (Pickering & Kisangani, 2006). In this section I 
will review the appropriate literature to illustrate the forms intervention can take, why 
interventions take place, and general outcomes of intervention.  
 
                                                          
2
 ‘Target state’ refers to the state that the intervention is directed at. ‘Sender state’ refers to the state that is 
undertaking the intervention. 
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Main Methods of Intervention 
Interventions can be coded as either hostile interventions, supportive interventions, or 
rival interventions. Hostile interventions oppose the target government while supportive 
interventions do the opposite. Rival interventions refer to a situation where at least two actors are 
intervening, with at least one supporting the target state’s government and at least one opposing 
the target state’s government. Supportive interventions are statistically more likely to hasten the 
end of a civil war, while hostile and rival interventions are more likely to prolong it (Pickering & 
Kisangani, 2006). Interventions that are military or transmissive in nature can be either hostile or 
supportive, whereas economic interventions are almost entirely hostile because it is generally not 
feasible to sanction or economically attack non-state actors.  
In the literature I found three main forms that interventions can take. The first is military 
intervention, which is what the common usage of the term intervention describes. A hostile 
military intervention by definition means going to war with the target state which is seen as a 
very costly action. Supportive military intervention means involving national forces in a foreign 
civil war, also a costly action. The 1999 NATO bombing of Kosovo, which targeted the Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia, is an excellent example of a hostile military intervention. Despite high 
economic and political costs, military intervention is the most effective and direct of the three 
methods of intervention. In contrast to military intervention, economic sanctions are a less costly 
way of intervening in the affairs of a target state, and do not rely violence to be effective. 
Economic sanctions are a form of coercive intervention where a sender state attempts to 
reduce the overall economic welfare of a target state in order to coerce the target state’s regime 
to change its political behavior (Hufbauer, Schott, Elliott, 1990). The traditional rationale is that 
despite a lower probability of success, sanctions are a viable policy tool because they are lower 
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cost for the sender, they are less violent, and have lower human costs for the target than direct 
military intervention. In theory, sanctions work by reducing the available resources in the 
targeted state until the population is so deprived that they pressure their leaders to change their 
behavior (Allen & Lektzian, 2013). The current economic sanctions targeting Iran in an attempt 
to dissuade them from pursuing a nuclear program is a salient example of a hostile economic 
intervention. However, sanctions are criticized because the act of lowering the aggregate level of 
wealth and resources in a country disproportionately harms the poor and vulnerable, instead of 
the elites who are typically responsible for the behavior that incurred the sanctions in the first 
place. For example, the sanctions on Iran have harmed the average Iranian consumer and driven 
up prices for basic goods. In an attempt to mitigate this effect, ‘smart sanctions’ or ‘targeted 
sanctions’ are used to target only key industries and individuals. However, smart sanctions are 
often criticized as functioning more as a signaling mechanism rather than a coercive policy 
(Drezner, 2011).  
The transfer of funds, weapons, and fighters is an atypical method of intervention which 
can be either supportive or hostile. If the transfer is hostile, weapons and fighters unaffiliated 
with the sender state’s government aid the rebels. Rebel forces often need financial resources 
more than military support to initiate and persist in a conflict (Pickering & Kisangani, 2006). If 
the transfer is supportive it is generally intended to prop up a weak government that is unable to 
secure access to weapons, funding, and soldiers. It is important to note that transferring funds, 
weapons, or fighters can be direct or permissive. For example, a direct transfer would be a sender 
state’s government transferring funds directly to the government to support the target state 
against rebels. In contrast, a permissive transfer in the same situation would be private actors, 
ethnic allies, or special interests inside the sender state being permitted to transfer funds to their 
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chosen side in the target state with the tacit consent of their host state. Permissive transfers are an 
indication that greater distance from the conflict is preferred by the sender state. An example this 
in practice is presented by the Second Congo War, where Rwanda armed and supplied several 
rebel groups who fought against Rwanda’s enemy, the Democratic Republic of Congo. 
Rwanda’s actions constitute a hostile transfer intervention.  
 
Motivations for Intervention 
Interventions are motivated primarily by three factors. First, there are instrumental factors 
that include economic gains, domestic political concerns, military interest, and balance of power. 
Second are affective factors which are identity-based and include communal grievances, and 
shared senses of identity and ideology. Finally, there can be a normative motivation to intervene. 
The international norm of responsibility to protect (R2P), which is upheld by liberal-
internationalists, holds that intervention for humanitarian purposes is permissible in situations 
where  a state is unwilling or unable to protect its citizens from imminent atrocities, genocide, or 
ethnic cleansing (Williams, 2013). Ultimately the motive to intervene can be purely instrumental 
in nature, or a mix of instrumental and affective. However, it is rarely purely affective because 
states do not undertake costly interventions in situations where there are no real benefits outside 
the realm of ideological solidarity (Carment, James, & Taydas, 2006; Friedman, Long, & Biddle, 
2012). For example, while there were ideological and normative components to the 1999 Kosovo 
intervention, the realist explanation that preserving the stability of Eastern Europe was the 
principle motivation, carries more weight. However, states that are more secure, are able to 
absorb higher costs, and have higher military and economic capacity have the ability to intervene 
for more purely affective reasons (Walt, 1985). Ultimately, instrumental, affective, and 
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normative factors determine when and where intervention takes place by informing decision 
making processes that are made in a context largely dictated by realist logic.  
It is important to note that the United States is able to partially largely transcend the 
realist logic that dictates intervention decisions because of its hegemonic status. The United 
States is considered a hegemon due to its geographic location, unparalleled military and 
economic strength, and position of global leadership in international relations. As a hegemon, the 
US has fewer barriers or disincentives to stop it from intervening abroad than any other country. 
As a result, the US has undertaken military, economic, and transfer based interventions many 
times since its rise to hegemonic status. Overthrowing leaders in South America, bombing 
Kosovo and Somalia, and destroying centrifuges in Iran are all examples of this, to say nothing 
of the three case studies discussed below where the US plays a considerable role.  
The US’s propensity to intervene or invade sovereign states when it suits US interests is 
considered by some to be a weakness in hegemonic stability theory. Hegemonic stability theory 
holds that a unipolar system under a hegemon is stable configuration because the hegemon will 
underwrite and uphold global security. However, since no other states can come close to 
challenging the US, the hegemon does not need to be concerned with the balance of power. As a 
result, there are fewer realist checks on the US to stop it from undertaking foolish wars or 
interventions which can ultimately destabilize the international system, and cause or exacerbate 
sectarian conflict (Buzan, 2013). Essentially, a hegemon can afford to intervene for affective and 
normative reasons, and does not need to have vital interests informing the motivation to 
intervene. Arguably, this leads to ill thought out foreign adventurism, such as the 2003 invasion 
of Iraq, which has produced and exacerbated sectarian conflict in the Levant (Pape, 2009).  
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Instrumental factors are best understood through realist theory, which is based on the 
principal that international relations are inherently anarchical, and that the main goal of any state 
is survival. Further, realism holds that states are unitary, rational actors. As a result of this, states 
will decide to intervene when, after a careful consideration of instrumental factors, intervention 
is considered the best strategy to achieve their interests. This is because instrumental factors, 
such as how the decision to intervene, or not intervene, will affect the balance of power, are 
exactly the variables that inform the realist calculus behind what is considered the best strategy 
to achieve state interests. Supportive intervention can then be seen as a form of balancing 
through alliance formation. Balancing through alliance formation refers to two states allying in 
order to maintain a favorable balance of power relative to the allies’ adversaries. Realists believe 
that balancing, and therefore supportive intervention, is a tactic that is used to protect values and 
assets already possessed (Walt, 1985). States therefore have incentives to undertake a supportive 
intervention if the fall of the target state would produce an unfavorable shift in the balance of 
power for the sender state, or if the intervention would produce a favorable shift in the balance of 
power for the sender state. For example, one of the reasons Iran is intervening in support of the 
Syrian regime is because the fall of the regime would reduce Iran’s power relative to its regional 
adversaries (Heydemann, 2013b).  
Similarly, a hostile intervention is undertaken if the expected outcome produces a more 
favorable balance of power for the sender state. However, hostile interventions cannot be seen as 
realist alliance formation because they are essentially attacks on the target state. Instead, hostile 
interventions occur either when there is the sender state believes there is a high potential for gain 
at minimal cost3, or when the sender state perceives that the target state is a threat that cannot go 
                                                          
3
 For example, Saddam’s invasion of Kuwait can be explained by this logic. Saddam perceived a high potential for 
economic, and therefore balance of power gain at minimal cost by seizing Kuwait’s oil fields.  
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unaddressed. Hostile interventions are therefore often informed by the realist balance of threat 
theory, which holds that states will identify their greatest threats based on four instrumental 
factors: 1) the aggregate power of the target, 2) the geographic proximity of the target, 3) the 
offensive capacity of the target, 4) the perceived intentions of the target (Schweller, 1994). It is 
unsurprising to realists then that neighboring states are often considered threatening, especially if 
they are powerful, have offensive weapons, or an adversarial history. Historically, this describes 
almost any pairing of Middle Eastern states outside of the Gulf Coast Monarchies. This situation 
is exacerbated by the fact that many of the states in question are resource rich, creating 
incentives to intervene for greed purposes. It is interesting to note that in contrast to supportive 
interventions which are done to protect what is already possessed, hostile interventions can be 
undertaken to gain new assets and values.  
Affective factors that are rooted in identity are very salient in situations of sectarian 
conflicts or civil wars. Ethnic kin in neighboring states are natural allies for both rebel and 
regime forces, and are often the source of funds and fighters in the transfer method of 
intervention. Additionally, ethnic allies in a neighboring state can pressure their government to 
intervene more directly. Ideological solidarity can also motivate governments to intervene 
because of the perception that protecting and affirming an ideology abroad protects and affirms it 
at home (Walt, 1985) As a result, ethnic and sectarian linkages between a potential intervener 
and rebels has been shown to result in a higher likelihood of intervention, but this does not hold 
for ethnic linkages between a potential intervener and the target’s government (Carment, James, 
& Taydas, 2006; Friedman, Long, & Biddle, 2012). 
Normative motivation does not fit cleanly into either instrumental or affective factors. It 
functions more as a combination of the two. On the instrumental side, invoking R2P is based 
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partially on domestic political concerns of the sender state, and on the cooperation and collective 
action of the international community who will be influenced by realist factors (Williams, 2013). 
On the affective side, R2P is based on a global ideology of human rights and a global sense of 
morality, grievance, and responsibility. In practice, R2P has been applied selectively and rarely, 
an indication that R2P functions more as an affective factor than an instrumental one.  
 
Outcomes of Intervention 
 The outcome produced by an intervention will be unique and a consequence of the 
circumstances of the intervention. However, there are some generalized conclusions that can be 
drawn about what types of outcomes are the most likely. The outcomes produced by military 
intervention depend largely on whether the intervention is supportive or hostile. A supportive 
intervention is more likely to end an extant civil war in the target state. In contrast a hostile 
military intervention is more likely to prolong the conflict in question, and to increase the 
intensity of the conflict (Pickering & Kisangani, 2006). In addition to this, state failure is a 
possible result of a successful hostile intervention, and can lead to long lasting violence, 
insurgencies, sectarian conflict, and humanitarian crisis (Flibbert, 2013). It is because of this that 
I identify hostile interventions, and interventions that result in state weakness or failure as the 
key circumstances under which intervention causes or exacerbates sectarian conflict. 
 There is considerable academic debate on the utility of sanctions as a coercive tool. 
Ultimately the number of cases where sanctions alone can be shown to bring about a change in 
behavior in the target state is disputed (Hufbauer, Schott, Elliott, 1990; Pape, 1997). However 
sanctions generally succeed in their goal of reducing the aggregate welfare of the target state. 
This often translates into increased poverty leading to food and health insecurity for the middle 
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and lower class in the target state. Sanctions also often increase the civilian population’s 
dependency on the target state’s government due to state run rationing programs, and can create 
a ‘rally around the flag’ effect that increases nationalism (Allen & Lektzian, 2013). Finally, it is 
common for military intervention to follow the imposition of sanctions. This often combines the 
worst outcomes of both methods of intervention. Public health in the target state is drastically 
reduced, state failure is more likely, and the economic damage from the sanctions is compounded 
by the economic damage caused by violence.  
 
Perspectives on Sectarianism and Conflict 
 To address the literature on sectarianism and conflict as it relates to the Levant it is 
necessary to first understand the schism between Sunni and Shia Islam. Sunnis make up 
approximately 85% of the 1.6 billion Muslims in the world, Shias make up the remaining 15%, 
and a very small minority identify as members of subsects such as Alawites. Shias are a majority 
in Iran, Iraq, Azerbaijan, and Bahrain and have a plurality in Lebanon while Sunnis are the 
majority in more than 40 states (Council on Foreign Relations, 2014). The root of the schism 
between the two sects is over the rightful leadership of Islam. Shias believe that the cousin of 
Mohammed, Ali ibn Abi Talib and his descendants are part of a divine genealogy and should 
lead the Islamic community while Sunnis reject succession based on Mohammed’s bloodline and 
instead favor electing a caliph.  
 There has been a long history of Sunnis persecuting the Shia minority, which has resulted 
in the reductionist and orientalist view that contemporary sectarian conflict is a result of ‘ancient 
hatreds.’ The view that sectarian and ethnic conflicts are primordial in nature is supported by the 
essentialist school of thought, which holds that loyalty to a communal identity is based on, and 
reproduced by psychological needs and emotional factors. As a result, communities remember 
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past grievances and conflicts, and ultimately attack traditional enemies due to old hatreds and 
resentments (Kaufmann, 2005).  However, most scholars view the ancient hatred argument as too 
simplistic, and instead focus on political and economic factors to explain sectarian violence. For 
example, in Sunni dominated states the Shia minority often lack access to economic 
opportunities. Additionally, when a single sect controls the state that sect generally has almost 
exclusive access to the state’s resource rents, further economically marginalizing the rival sect. 
Both of these situations are exemplified by Iraq under Saddam’s rule. However, it is important to 
not fully discount a history of conflict between the two sects as a factor that informs conflict 
today. Negative sectarian sentiments are not created on the spot, instead they exist dormantly and 
are informed by the histories, stories, and conflicting ideologies of the two sects, until sectarian 
identity becomes politically relevant (Haddad, 2013; Lake & Rothchild, 1996). Despite these 
factors, the fact remains that during the 1000 years prior to the turn of the millennium there were 
only three instances of substantive sectarian conflict in the Levant (Haddad, 2013). This is strong 
evidence that political, economic, and social factors must be analyzed to understand the causes of 
sectarianism and conflict.  
 In analyzing these factors I found a common theme permeating theories of sectarian 
conflict. There is a pathway to sectarian conflict, one that perhaps takes place in the context of 
historic animosities, but is largely based on systematic factors that cause sectarian identity to 
become an incredibly important part of everyday life (Kfir, 2014). This pathway can be broken 
down into four distinct segments: fear, identification and mobilization, the security dilemma, and 
the conflict spiral. It is important to note that this pathway can be nonlinear and self-reinforcing; 
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multiple stages can occur at the same time and the stages from mobilization onwards can form a 
positive feedback loop4 which fuels perceptions of fear (Kalyvas & Kocher, 2007). 
 
Perception of Fear for the Future 
The pathway to sectarian conflict begins with the introduction of factors that cause 
individuals and groups to fear for the future (Hshim, 2007; Lake & Rothchild, 1996). Fear for the 
future can be generated in many different ways. The most direct way is a situation where 
individuals come to fear for their physical safety and livelihoods.  This is often the case in a 
situation of “emerging anarchy” which describes a scenario where individuals and groups are 
newly responsible for their own security (Carment, James, Taydas, 2009, 78). In a situation of 
emerging anarchy, the state is unable or unwilling to provide for the security of certain 
individuals and groups. Emerging anarchy is common in cases of failed, weak, or disrupted 
states (Flibbert, 2013; Lake & Rothchild, 1996; Saikal, 2000).  
Another factor that can increase perceptions of fear is the loss of public services. This is 
also generally related to state weakness. Loss of services can increase perceptions of fear 
because of the perception that the state is weakening, the perception that one is being 
marginalized or discriminated against, or more benignly, the perception that the loss of the 
service will decrease economic security (Koubi & Bohmelt, 2013; Prasch, 2012). Services whose 
loss will increase perceptions of fear include security, property rights, contract enforcement, 
social services, utilities such as electricity and water, and infrastructure maintenance (Di John, 
2010).  
                                                          
4
 A positive feedback loop is a feedback loop where a change to a system causes the change/the cause of the change 
to be increased 
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 Fear for the future can also be generated by marginalization, which can be both political 
and economic in nature. Political marginalization can mean disenfranchisement, loss of political 
rights, lack of access to state institutions, no protection of minority rights, and the capture of the 
state by a rival ethnic group (Ayub, 2013; Carment, James, & Taydas, 2009). This can lead 
individuals and groups to foresee a future of greater marginalization with less security and 
opportunity, thus increasing perceptions of fear.  
Economic marginalization is the most salient under conditions of corruption and crony 
capitalism (Prasch, 2012). Under these conditions, one sect or ethnic group exists in a privileged 
position that is able to obtain the majority of a state’s economic gains, or when one group has 
privileged access to the best jobs and opportunities in an economy. Similar to political 
marginalization, this leads individuals and groups to predict a future of greater marginalization 
with less security and opportunity. It is important to realize that in a situation where one sect 
holds a privileged position, be it political, economic, or both, the potential or actual loss of that 
privileged position will increase the privileged sect’s perception of fear as well. (Koubi & 
Bohmelt, 2013; Murshed, 2010). This is because the loss of a privileged position entails not only 
a reduction in opportunity, but also the potential for retribution. 
The ultimate effect of increased perceptions of fear is increased incentives to construct a 
sectarian identity, or to identify with a sectarian identity more strongly in order to obtain utility 
and tangible benefits. This is supported by rational choice theory, which holds that individuals 
make efforts to maximize their preferences in a rational way (Kaufman, 2005). The result is that 
the self-interest of rational individuals leads to group identification so that the individuals can 
access services and goods controlled by the group. It is important to note that the factors that 
increase perceptions of fear for the future do not need to be sectarian in nature, or take place in a 
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context of sectarian hostility because the end result of increasing sectarian identification is the 
same. However, fears that are sectarian in nature or take place in the context of sectarian hostility 
will be more acute, and will increase the speed and the scope of identification and mobilization. 
This is supported by the essentialist framework, which holds that emotional responses drive 
group formation, and that negative emotions regarding the ethnic or sectarian ‘other’ solidifies 
in-groups, and incentivizes mobilization (Kaufman, 2005).  
 
Identification and Mobilization 
 A common theme in the factors that increase perceptions of fear is the loss, or potential 
future loss, of services and commodities. What is lost can be intangible in nature, political 
enfranchisement or security for example, or a tangible service such as provision of a utility. Once 
perception of fear grows enough, which is to say once enough is lost or endangered in aggregate, 
individuals seek a way to recoup past losses and protect against future losses. This is 
accomplished through increased affiliation and identification with a sectarian group and identity. 
Group membership is achieved by displaying certain behaviors and social traits which actively 
identify an individual as part of the group via social comparison (Fkir, 2014). Through sectarian 
identification individuals gain real-world utility from their sectarian affiliation. Sectarian groups 
provide services that increase the economic and physical security of their members. In essence, 
social identification yields tangible benefits that mitigate perceptions of fear (Kfir, 2014; 
Murshed, 2010).  
The process by which services and benefits are actually provided to group members is 
called mobilization. Sectarian groups are able to mobilize faster and more efficiently than most 
other groups for several reasons. Sectarian groups can easily recruit from within their community, 
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can easily overcome the collective action problem, and have established leaders and meeting 
places. Additionally, sectarian groups can easily utilize built in symbols and ideals, have a shared 
history and set of myths to invoke, and often have members from diverse social strata which 
allows for a division of labor between financing and labor (Koubi & Bohmelt, 2013).  
Constructivism is a useful theoretical lens for understanding this process. Constructivism 
holds that group identity is constructed through iterated social discourse. Because of this, myths 
involving past atrocities committed against the in-group are particularly important to group 
formation and mobilization because they create a sense of communal identity while also 
increasing perceptions of fear (Kaufman, 2005).  
Provision of security is the clearest example of a communal group providing a good or 
service, and is the most pertinent in a discussion on sectarian conflict. In a situation of emerging 
anarchy, individuals who are newly responsible for their physical security will have rapidly 
increasing perceptions of fear. The newly insecure then find their sectarian identity more salient 
than ever before. This is doubly true if insecurity is caused by sectarian conflict because then 
one’s sectarian identity makes them a target as well as providing them access to a protective 
group (Kalyvas, & Kocher, 2007). To obtain security and services that the state can no longer (or 
is unwilling to) provide, individuals turn to the most relevant social group they have access to, 
which for the reasons given above will be groups mobilizing based on sectarian affiliation 
(Koubi & Bohmelt, 2013). This same process can take place outside the context of a security risk 
or emerging anarchy. Salient sectarian affiliation can be used to mitigate the loss of services, 
utilities, or to balance against marginalization. 
Increased perceptions of fear, identification, and mobilization can occur outside the 
context of sectarian conflict and as a result of nonsectarian causes. Despite this, mobilization 
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undertaken in these stages to increase security has the inherent ability to provoke a negative 
sectarian response. As discussed earlier, this is partially due to a shared history that includes 
marginalization and violence between the two sects which becomes relevant in lockstep with 
identity becoming relevant in daily life (Haddad, 2013). However, a more important factor in 
creating a negative sectarian response is the logic of the security dilemma which takes hold in 
this situation.  
 
The Security Dilemma 
 The security dilemma describes a situation where one state increases its military 
capability in order to increase its security. This diminishes the security of other states if the 
original state is unable to credibly signal that it does not have aggressive intentions, and all the 
states exist in an anarchical environment with imperfect information and unresolvable 
uncertainty. An arms race and a conflict spiral is the likely result. The security dilemma can be 
applied to sectarian groups because the realist logic behind the security dilemma remains 
constant. Just like states, sectarian groups can be seen as unitary, rational actors whose primary 
goal and motivation is survival (Kaufman, 2005). As a result, the realist logic of the security 
dilemma can be applied to sectarian groups in conditions of emerging anarchy. In essence when 
one sectarian group seeks to increase its security by mobilizing and arming itself, other sectarian 
groups perceive their security as reduced and will mobilize and arm themselves in turn (Flibbert, 
2013).  
Additionally, realism’s offense/defense theory informs this part of the pathway. 
Offense/Defense theory holds that states, or in this case sectarian groups, have a preference 
between offensive and defensive military tactics because of the advantages that either strategy 
confers. In this context, an offensive strategy is seen as preferential because the first group to 
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martially mobilize and begin committing offensive violent acts has a first mover advantage and 
is almost impossible to defend against. As a result, not only does the security dilemma increase 
perceptions of fear, it also incentivizes preemptive attacks. While the stages before the security 
dilemma do not necessarily involve sectarian polarization and animosity to function, in the 
security dilemma they are inevitable.  
 For example, in a situation of emerging anarchy or state disruption the presence of a Shia 
militia in a nearby neighborhood incentivizes Sunnis to mobilize and militarize to ensure their 
security. However, doing so increases perceptions of fear among nearby Shias who see their own 
security as lessened. Even if the Shia militia was formed for nonsectarian reasons, it still 
inflames sectarian tensions and provokes a sectarian response. If the Shia militia was formed for 
sectarian reasons, the same process occurs but with greater intensity due to higher perceptions of 
fear among Sunnis. The end result is less security for everyone and an increasing likelihood of 
falling into a conflict spiral where actual violence reinforces and exacerbates the security 
dilemma (Carment, James, Taydas, 2009).  Ultimately, a feedback loop is formed to the first 
stage on the pathway to sectarian conflict, perception of fear. Many scholars argue that sectarian 
war is fundamentally built on the logic of the security dilemma which dictates balancing in terms 
of mobilization in any situation where credibility cannot be established (Kalyvas & Kocher, 2007; 
Kaufman, 2005; Lake & Rothchild, 1996).  
 
Conflict Spiral 
Once sectarian mobilization has resulted in a security dilemma the scene is fully prepped 
for sectarian conflict to begin. A conflict spiral describes the situation where once a violent act is 
committed by one sect against another, the security dilemma becomes so exacerbated and 
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grievances become so inflamed that a cycle of revenge attacks becomes inevitable (Hashim, 
2007). In the conflict spiral, attacks by one sect against another fuel perceptions of fear and 
ultimately come to drive the entire process by which fear is translated into actual violence. In 
essence, extant sectarian violence is itself the cause of sectarian polarization and mobilization as 
well as its consequence (Kalyvas & Kocher, 2007).  
In addition to increasing perceptions of fear, the conflict spiral also increases the scope 
and speed of identification and mobilization. This is because religious and political violence 
increases religiosity (Zussman, 2014). Because sectarian identity now turns individuals into 
targets, those individuals now have a strong incentive to leverage that identity for protection by 
their sect. This then leads to quicker and more martial mobilization for mutual protection which 
in turn fuels the security dilemma. It is by this process that the pathway to sectarian conflict 
becomes a positive feedback loop. This helps explain the growth of sectarian conflict ex post and 
why sectarian conflicts are so difficult to end.  
The initiation of conflict can turn a nonviolent sectarian cleavage into a dominant feature 
of daily life. The result of this is that violence can cause further sectarian conflict that is 
unrelated to the factors that precipitated the violence in the first place. Over time sectarian or 
ethnic groups can find themselves involved in an ongoing conflict that is based far more off of 
the animosity between the two groups than any original concrete objectives. (Kalyvas & Kocher, 
2007). This phenomenon actually lends some weight to the essentialist ‘ancient hatreds’ 
argument because it seems possible for a sectarian or ethnic conflict that was originally political 
in nature to morph into a primordial conflict based on hatred for the rival group (Kaufman, 2005). 
Essentially, while sectarian conflicts are born from economic and political issues rather than 
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identity politics, they are sustained and intensified by fear, identification, and conflict spirals 
rooted in identity (Carment, James, & Taydas, 2009).  
 
Exacerbating Factors 
There are six main structural factors that influence the entire pathway from perceptions of 
fear to the conflict spiral. These are poverty, state weakness, the presence of manipulative 
leaders, the resource curse, neoliberal economic policies, and corruption. These factors increase 
the general likelihood that the final stages of the pathway will be reached. While poverty is no 
longer seen as the main determinant behind terrorism, it is still widely considered to increase the 
likelihood of civil war and sectarian conflict. (Azam & Thelen, 2010; Carment, James, & Taydas, 
2009; Koubi & Bohmelt, 2013; Murshed, 2010). 
State weakness can, as discussed above, create conditions of emerging anarchy which 
greatly increases the utility of sectarian identity and perceptions of fear. A weak state has a lower 
capacity to suppress rebellions which increases the likelihood that a conflict will arise and fuel 
perceptions of fear. Additionally, a poorly organized rebellion against a weak state is more likely 
to leverage the cheapest mobilization network possible: ethnicity and sectarianism. Finally, while 
a strong state has the ability to end a sectarian conflict inside its borders, or to win a sectarian 
civil war, it also has the ability to forcefully limit the expression of sectarian identity and 
negative sectarian sentiment (Kalyvas & Kocher, 2007; Kaufman, 2005). The result is that 
sectarian conflict almost inevitably takes place in a context of state weakness. The more 
disrupted the state, the greater the risk of conflict, and the presence of a sectarian conflict 
generally only makes the state weaker.  
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Manipulative leaders, who are referred to in the literature as ‘ethnic entrepreneurs,’ can 
exacerbate, or even cause sectarian conflict. Ethnic entrepreneurs are individuals who obtain, or 
wish to obtain, public office or social power by appealing to a specific ethnic constituency, and 
by playing on people’s fears of an ethic ‘other’ (Lake & Rothechild, 1996). The manipulative 
power of ethnic entrepreneurs is supported by the constructivist perspective which argues that 
since collective identities are constantly made and remade through social discourse, identities 
can be easily coopted by manipulative leaders who control the discourse (Kaufman, 2005). The 
result is that ethnic entrepreneurs legitimize ethnic violence, advocate for mobilization, and 
exaggerate the risk and hostility of the other in order to build a constituency. In practice this 
increases sectarian polarization, fuels the pathway to conflict by increasing perceptions of fear, 
and can greatly exacerbate extant conflicts. Ethnic entrepreneurs are especially common in 
contexts of state weakness where they are able to use ethnic mobilization, or violence, to cement 
their power and delineate an in-group (Beswick, 2009). Iraq’s former Prime Minister, al-Maliki, 
is an excellent example of an ethnic entrepreneur. By stoking fears of Sunni extremism he 
appealed to Iraq’s Shia majority, and once in power he oversaw numerous policies that 
disenfranchised, and legitimized violence against Sunnis. However, it is important to note that 
ethnic entrepreneurs do not need to be state leaders or politicians, they can also operate on a 
neighborhood level.  
The resource curse and corruption are two exacerbating factors that create grievances in 
society which are often experienced on sectarian lines (Brannigan, 2014; Prasch, 2012). The 
resource curse describes a situation where revenue from natural resources is accompanied by 
poverty and corruption, two factors which exacerbate sectarian polarization. Resource rents 
allow political elites to enrich themselves through corruption. Income inequality is often further 
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increased by crony capitalism, which reserves economic opportunities and privileges for state 
elites. Under these conditions, it is common for economic gains to go primarily to one ethnic 
group, especially if that group has captured the state to obtain resource rents (Lake & Rothchild, 
1996; Prash, 2012). This all ultimately increases negative sectarian sentiment and creates a fertile 
environment for the pathway to sectarian conflict by creating a feeling of communal injury 
(Koubi & Bohmelt, 2013; Prash, 2012). 
This entire situation can be further aggravated by neoliberal economic policies. Many 
states in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) pursued neoliberal policies in a bid to 
capture greater foreign investment, and jumpstart their nascent private sectors which were 
generally underdeveloped due to oil rents (Achcar, 2013). The failure of these neoliberal polices 
can be partially blamed for the region’s poverty in recent years. 5 Neoliberal policies, which 
prescribed lower rates of public investment, were supposed to lead to higher rates of private 
investment by getting the state out of the market, and increased foreign investment by lowering 
trade barriers. However, the private sector’s contributions did not offset the loss of public 
investment funded by oil rents. Instead, gross capital formation stagnated between 1982 and 
2007, the ratio of private investment to GDP remained one of the lowest in the world, foreign 
direct investment never materialized, and unemployment boomed (Achcar, 2013, 44). A large 
population of poor, unemployed young people is destabilizing because they are a pool of 
potential recruits for terrorist or sectarian groups. Additionally, neoliberal polices exacerbate 
corruption in weak states, and states without strong institutions by incentivizing and facilitating 
patrimonialism and rent seeking behavior. Essentially, neoliberal economic polices both 
exacerbated and caused poverty, while also facilitating corruption and bad governance (Achcar, 
                                                          
5
 The poverty I am referring too, and the following statistics, exclude the Gulf Coast Countries which have arguably 
benefited considerably from globalization and neoliberal policies.  
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2013). Ultimately, since poverty and corruption are factors which can lead to and exacerbate 
sectarian conflict, neoliberalism helps lead to and exacerbates sectarian conflict as well.  
 
Conclusions on Sectarianism and Conflict 
 To address the question of under which circumstances intervention increase the 
likelihood of sectarian conflict I will apply the results of intervention to the model of sectarian 
conflict described above. Interventions that result in increased state weakness and higher 
perceptions of fear, or more generally increase the utility of sectarian identity are the most likely 
to exacerbate a sectarian security dilemma and create a conflict spiral. The circumstances that 
allow for this that are identifiable from my literature review of sectarianism and conflict are 
conditions of emerging anarchy, poverty, corruption, and sectarian grievances based on 
economic and political marginalization. Ultimately, hostile interventions and the resulting state 
weakness or failure, as well as sectarian grievances and marginalization, and the active presence 
of ethnic entrepreneurs are identified as the circumstances under which intervention will cause or 
exacerbate sectarian conflict.  
 
Iraq in 1990: Hostile Economic and Military Interventions 
 While the case studies I present can be viewed as three discrete events, it is also 
beneficial to view them as a single Levantine case study evolving over time with three periods in 
that evolution being observed. The three periods correspond to three different sets of 
interventions into the region and encompass hostile, supportive, and ultimately rival 
interventions. This allows an analysis of how and why interventions in practice result in, fail to 
result in, or exacerbate sectarian conflict. The first analyzed period is Iraq in the 1990s, when the 
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state was targeted with hostile economic and military intervention. These interventions can be 
seen as purely instrumental in nature. Western states viewed Iraq as an unfriendly regime, and 
saw the invasion of Kuwait as a revisionist action that would reduce regional stability and energy 
security. Arab states saw the invasion of Kuwait as an attempt to revise the regional balance of 
power, and resisted the action by supporting the western led and UN sanctioned coalition.  
 During the 1970s, Iraq saw a huge increase in oil revenue. There was less than 1 billion 
US dollars of oil revenue in 1970, but by 1980 this had increased to 26 billion dollars. This 
money allowed for substantial development of the government bureaucracy, the development of 
a strong social security net, the expansion of the military, financed infrastructure improvements 
and paid for imports (Alnasrawi, 2001, 206). As a result of this, prior to the invasion of Kuwait, 
Iraq was considered to be one of the most developed states in the Middle East (Ismael, 2007; 
Talmadge, 2000).  
 However, economic stagnation accompanied expansive growth of Iraq’s military during 
the 1980s. The percentage of the labor force in the military increased from 3% to 21% from 1975 
to 1988 and the percentage of GDP spent on the military increased from 19% to almost two 
thirds in the same period (Alnasrawi, 2001, 206). The increased military spending came at the 
cost of improving living conditions, which coupled with an inability to substantially increase oil 
rents incentivized Saddam’s regime to invade Kuwait on August 2nd, 1990. Saddam’s decision to 
seize Kuwait’s oil fields conforms nicely to the realist theory that hostile intervention are 
undertaken to gain new assets. The bid to seize Kuwait’s oil fields as a solution to Iraq’s 
economic stagnation and to finance populist policies resulted in a comprehensive sanctions 
regime being implemented by the UNSC on August 6th (Alnasrawi, 2001, 206).  
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 The sanctions regime cut Iraq off from the global economy, essentially ended Iraq’s oil 
trade, froze financial assets, and involved a naval and air blockade. The result was a drastic 
decrease in food security; Iraq had previously imported 70%-80% of its total food consumption. 
The Iraqi government quickly instituted a rationing program, which as the intervention literature 
suggests, resulted in greater state control over the population (Alnasrawi, 2001, 209; Talmadge, 
2000). Additionally, the inability to obtain spare parts and repair supplies quickly began to 
inhibit Iraq’s critical industries which were import reliant (Talmadge, 2000).  
 Economic intervention alone did not coerce Saddam to pull out of Kuwait, nor did it 
result in increased sectarian conflict. The reason for this is despite the economic and human costs 
of the sanction regime, Iraq still had a strong state. The Iraqi state kept negative sectarians 
sentiments in check and mitigated perceptions of fear. Despite discriminatory policies which 
favored Sunnis and Ba’ath party members, as well as cuts to social services, perceptions of fear 
for the future were kept low by government rationing programs and the continued provision of 
security and public goods (Alnasrawi, 2001).  
 Hostile military intervention against Iraq started on January 16th 1991 with a US led 
bombing campaign that eviscerated Iraq’s military and quickly led to a full scale Iraqi retreat 
from Kuwait. This event can also be seen as a supportive military intervention aiding Kuwait. 
When framed as a supportive intervention, the decision to sanction and bomb Saddam’s forces 
conforms nicely to the realist explanation that supportive interventions are undertaken to 
preserve what is already possessed, in this case access to Kuwaiti oil and a favorable balance of 
power in the region. However, coalition bombing inside Iraq was not limited to military targets, 
which suggests that it is simplistic to view the military intervention as purely supportive of 
Kuwait. Civilian targets including water treatment plants, power stations, telecom networks, 
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industrial sites, oil facilities, and civilian buildings were also bombed (Alnasrawi, 2001). 
Viewing the bombing as a hostile intervention with the goal of attacking Saddam’s regime also 
conforms to the realist theory that hostile interventions are undertaken to gain something, in this 
case the removal of Saddam. 
 As the literature suggests, economic intervention combined with military intervention 
created a humanitarian crisis. Over 1.5 million Iraqi, including roughly six hundred thousand 
children died from diseases related to unsafe water and inadequate nourishment which could not 
be treated without imported medicines. Incidence of stunting and wasting also increased 
dramatically in the following years (Ismael, 2007, 343). Unemployment increased dramatically, 
hyperinflation was accompanied by rapidly increasing prices, and salaries fell dramatically. 
Electricity output in Iraq fell to only 4% of the pre-bombing levels and oil production was 
substantially reduced (Alnasrawi, 2001, 210; Ismael, 2007). 
 Despite a humanitarian crisis, a decimated economy and infrastructure, and continued 
sanctions that precluded rebuilding, no substantial sectarian conflict emerged after the 
interventions. It is reasonable to assume that perceptions of fear for the future increased due to 
these outcomes but increased perceptions of fear did not translate into sectarian conflict. This is 
because in addition to maintaining the ability to actively surprises ethnic violence, the Iraqi state 
remained strong enough to continue providing services and guaranteeing security. The pathway 
to sectarian conflict was interrupted between ‘increased perceptions of fear’ and ‘identification 
and mobilization’ because there was little utility gained from increased sectarianism that the state 
could not also provide. The result of this was that a sectarian security dilemma and subsequent 
conflict spiral were never created.  
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 Evidence for this can be found in several places. First and foremost, Saddam’s regime 
remained in power. This is a strong indication that while the Iraqi state was disrupted, and saw 
its capacity reduced, it did not experience state failure. The food rationing program instituted 
soon after the sanction regime, and later the UN’s Oil For Food program (OFFP) increased state 
control over the population and provided channels for the state to deliver social services 
(Alnasrawi, 2001; Talmadge, 2000). The continuance of Saddam’s regime ensured that a 
situation of emerging anarchy was not created. Government food rationing ensured that the 
population would not turn to sectarian mobilization to ensure their food security. The OFFP 
provided revenue which the Iraqi government used to provide reduced but extant social services 
and utilities to the population. This disincentivized sectarian identification and mobilization to 
obtain the same services and utilities. While the first two interventions into Iraq did not result in 
sectarian conflict, they created conditions which proved fertile for sectarian conflict after the 
2003 military intervention thoroughly destroyed the Iraqi state.  
 
Iraq in 2003: Hostile Military Intervention and Sectarian Civil War 
 The next period of intervention in the Levant is the US-led 2003 invasion of Iraq. In 
contrast to the 1990 interventions, the 2003 intervention was purely military in nature and caused 
sectarian civil war. Ultimately, the factors that can be identified as contributing to this are forced 
state failure and grievances due to marginalization experienced by both Shias and Sunnis which 
together allowed the pathway to sectarian conflict to produce a security dilemma and conflict 
spiral.  
Viewed through a realist lens, this intervention was motivated by a high perception of 
threat. Dick Chaney’s one-percent doctrine held that intervention was warranted in any situation 
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where there was even a one-percent chance of terrorists gaining access to a WMD. The US had a 
high perception of threat because the suspected presence of WMDs represented a high offensive 
capacity, coupled with a perception of malignant intentions. That the likelihood of the threat 
occurring could be so low and still warrant an invasion is evidence that a hegemon has fewer 
barriers to stop them from intervening. Other realist justifications for the invasion of include the 
desire to create a deeper military and political presence in the region, and the desire to influence 
and protect the development and extraction of oil resources (Balaam & Dillman, 2011). It is 
important to note that as realism predicts of hostile interventions, these conceptions of the 
intervention end with the US gaining new assets.  
 
State Failure in Iraq 
Iraq experienced forced state failure for several reasons after the 2003 military 
intervention. The invasion of Iraq destroyed what little public infrastructure survived the first 
Gulf War and a decade of deprivation from sanctions. For instance, after the 2003 invasion, 80% 
of Iraq’s higher education institutions were destroyed, only 15% of the population had at least 12 
hours of electricity per day, and a third of the population lacked access to safe drinking water 
(Ismael, 2000, 346). In addition to the physical damage, the 2003 military intervention resulted 
in the destruction of two of the Iraqi institutions which could have potentially preserved law and 
order.  
The US-mandated process of de-Ba’athification purged the Iraqi government of many 
former members of the Ba’ath party. This process was not limited to party elites: many mid and 
low level bureaucrats were also removed. The result of the purges was massive Sunni 
disenfranchisement, and the destruction of Iraq’s bureaucracy (Ayub, 2013; Kalyvas & Kocher, 
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2007). The destruction of the bureaucracy undermined administrative capacity and created a 
political vacuum which no actors were immediately able to fill. This contributed to the situation 
of emerging anarchy because there was no legitimate authority to provide public goods (Flibbert, 
2013). In addition to dismantling Iraq’s bureaucracy, the US administrative authority disbanded 
Iraq’s military and other security apparatuses. Not only did this create a security vacuum, it 
created a huge population of unemployed young men with military training, a grudge against the 
United States, and potential sectarian grievances. The result was an additional contribution to 
emerging anarchy (Bensahel, 2006; Flibbert, 2013).  
 This political and security vacuum was created in the context of the ongoing 
humanitarian disaster created by the military and economic interventions of the first Gulf War. In 
the 1990s, a strong Iraqi state kept the country from falling into chaos and sectarian conflict, but 
that state strength no longer existed after 2003. The result was state failure. As the literature on 
sectarianism and conflict would suggest, with the state no longer able to guarantee security or 
other goods and services, a situation of emerging anarchy was created and the pathway to 
sectarian conflict was put into motion. Immediate effects of state failure could be seen in the 
rampant looting and violence that took place shortly after the fall of Baghdad. Ultimately it 
would take several years for the situation in Iraq to descend into full scale civil war as 
perceptions of fear, negative sectarian sentiment, and the security dilemma all became more 
acute.  
 
Sectarian Grievances in Iraq 
 In addition to the immediate personal and group security concerns created by the 
situation of emerging anarchy, old and new grievances helped create negative sectarian 
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sentiments which increased perceptions of fear and the utility of sectarian identity. Iraq’s Sunni 
minority had enjoyed decades of privileged status under Saddam’s regime, and in the process 
accumulated substantial ill will from the country’s Shias and Kurds. The process of de-
Ba’athification created an inversion of the power relationship between the two sects; Shias now 
controlled Iraq allowing for the marginalization of Sunnis. Nouri al-Malaki, Iraq’s president 
from 2006 till 2014, exacerbated this situation by integrating Shia militias into the political body, 
and by legitimizing the marginalization and violence committed against Sunnis (Hashim, 2007; 
Khoury, 2013).  
This situation of marginalization experienced on sectarian lines fits into the theory where 
perceptions of fear are increased when a rival ethnic group captures the state (Ayub, 2013; 
Carment, James, & Taydas, 2009). Additionally, the situation of mutual grievances experienced 
on sectarian lines fits into the theory that group grievances lead to increased sectarian 
identification and conflict (Koubi & Bohmelt, 2013). As the literature suggests to be a likely 
outcome in this situation, Sunnis began mobilizing quickly after the 2003 military intervention in 
attempts to regain lost power and privilege, and to protect themselves from Shia retribution 
(Flibbert, 2013).  
 
Application of Intervention and Sectarian Theory to Iraq 
 State failure, humanitarian crisis, and marginalization all resulted in increased 
perceptions of fear, and increased utility from sectarian identification and mobilization. Both 
Sunnis and Shias began mobilizing soon after the fall of Baghdad to provide for their own 
security. One example of this is urban migration inside Baghdad. Roughly 80% of Baghdad’s 
residents relocated from formerly multiethnic neighborhoods to the perceived safety of 
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homogenous neighborhoods (Carpenter, 2012, 184). Ultimately, mobilization translated into 
security dilemmas and conflict spirals as sectarian violence became more common in Iraq.  
This process can be seen in the normalized presence of sectarian militias that operated out 
of homogenous neighborhoods and regions. Al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) and the Ja’ish Mahdi Army 
(JAM) were, respectively, the main Sunni and Shia militias.6 However, smaller sectarian militias 
were often organized at the neighborhood level and were seen (and often acted) as the last line of 
defense for their local community (Carpenter, 2012; Hashim, 2007). While these militias were 
the natural product of mobilized sectarian groups providing services for their constituents, their 
very presence provoked a security dilemma. Essentially, the formation of any sectarian militia 
decreased the perceived security and increased perceptions of fear for anyone in the rival sect 
who the militia could potentially attack. This then incentivized the rival sect to create their own 
militia, which of course resulted in increased perceptions of fear and lowered perceptions of 
security for the original sect.  
The movement along the pathway to sectarian conflict from the security dilemma to the 
conflict spiral took place as sectarian violence became more prevalent. Both AQI and JAM 
directly targeted the rival sect with tactics that included assassinating tribal leaders, government 
officials, religious leaders, mass killings, and bombing civilian and religious targets (Carpenter, 
2012; Hashim, 2007). This created an environment where sectarian identity played the dual role 
of making individuals into targets as well as providing them with security and services through 
sectarian identification. As theorized in the literature, this created a situation where sectarian 
                                                          
6
 AQI and JAM are also considered terrorist groups. Terrorist groups carry out the same functions in the pathway to 
sectarian conflict (e.g. increasing perceptions of fear and aggravating the security dilemma), but are considered by 
some scholars as a separate category of actor from purely sectarian groups and militias because they replace 
providing club goods and services to a broad sectarian constituency a broader political agenda. However, other 
scholars argue that terrorist groups exist not to pursue a political agenda, but to provide club goods and services to 
the in-group, and to create an environment of social solidarity (Abrahms, 2008) 
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violence itself surmounted all the other factors that had previously increased perceptions of fear. 
Sectarian violence came to be the cause and consequence of identification and mobilization 
(Kalyvas & Kocher, 2007). As a result the security dilemma was exacerbated past the breaking 
point, and a cycle of revenge attacks on civilian populations as well as rival militias was started.  
By February 2006, Iraq was in a state of sectarian civil war. In the following month 
nearly 4000 Iraqis were killed in sectarian violence (Hashim, 2007, 3). There are two main 
factors identified in the literature on intervention and sectarianism that can be identified in this 
case study as contributing to sectarian civil war after the military intervention: state failure and 
marginalization. State failure is recognized as increasing the likelihood of sectarian conflict, and 
hostile interventions are understood as being the most likely to result in state failure (Pickering & 
Kisangani, 2006; Saikal, 2000). As the literature suggests to be the likely outcome, the US led 
hostile intervention resulted in state failure due in part to the subsequent dissolution of Iraq’s 
army and bureaucracy, as well as the near total destruction of Iraq’s infrastructure.  
The resource curse is also identified in the literature as a condition that increases the 
likelihood of sectarian conflict by creating and inflaming grievances over economic and political 
marginalization. Sectarian grievances themselves are also identified in the literature as a factor 
that increases the likelihood of sectarian conflict (Koubi & Bohmelt, 2013). Prior to 2003, Iraq’s 
Shia majority resented being ruled by a Sunni minority who disproportionately benefited from 
oil rents, and who had access to political and economic opportunities that Shias did not. After the 
2003 intervention, the relationship of privilege and grievance between Shias and Sunnis was 
inverted and further exacerbated by de-Ba’athification and state legitimized marginalization and 
violence under Maliki who can fairly be construed as a political entrepreneur. As predicted in the 
literature, state failure resulted in a condition of emerging anarchy (Carment, James, & Taydas, 
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2009). This was coupled with mutual and acute sectarian grievances which the literature suggests 
served to keep historical animosities alive and kept sectarian identity politically relevant and 
utilitarian (Haddad, 2013). Ultimately, both Iraqi case studies supports my argument that state 
failure, sectarian grievances and marginalization, poverty, and the active presence of ethnic 
entrepreneurs causes and exacerbates sectarian conflict.  
 
Syria in 2011: Rival Interventions and Civil War  
The final period of intervention in the Levant concerns the Syrian civil war between 2011 
and early 2014. This period does not include recent developments such as US airstrikes in Syria 
and Iraq which would rightly deserve their own section. Numerous state and non-state actors 
have intervened in Syria on behalf of both the Assad regime and the rebels. As the literature 
suggests, rival interventions resulted in a bloodier, protracted conflict (Pickering & Kisangani, 
2006). To identify the conditions that caused interventions in Syria to result in sectarian conflict 
this section will analyze the genesis of the Syrian civil war, the motivations and methods for both 
the supportive and hostile interventions, and the outcomes these interventions produced.  
 
Social, Political and Economic Causes of the Syrian Civil War 
The progression from peaceful protests in Syria to a full blown sectarian civil war that is 
spilling over Syria’s boarders requires an analysis of the social, political, and economic 
conditions inside Syria prior to the initiation of the conflict. Analysis of these factors allows 
some of the conditions under which intervention results in increased sectarian conflict to be 
identified. High levels of poverty, marginalization and grievances, neoliberalism, oil rents and 
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one sectarian group capturing the state were all extant conditions in Syria prior to 2011, and are 
all identified in the literature as factors that make sectarian conflict more likely.  
One of the most important social factors is the country’s diverse population. The majority 
of Syria’s population is Sunni Muslim. However, the state is ruled by the minority Alawite sect 
(an offshoot of Shia Islam) under the Assad regime. There are also numerous ethnic minorities 
that include Shias, Kurds, Druze, Christians, Turkomen, and Ismailis. Syria borders Turkey, 
Lebanon, Israel, Jordan, and Iraq and as a result all of the larger religious groups have ethnic 
allies in bordering states (Noueihed & Warren, 2013). Another pertinent social factor is that the 
Assad regime historically and contemporarily portrays itself as a defender of the secular state and 
minority rights.  
An economic factor that helped lead Syria into civil war were the neoliberal reforms 
undertaken by Bashar al-Assad after he replaced his father as the Syrian president in 2000. These 
reforms were supposed to liberalize trade, expand the banking sector, increase foreign 
investment, and reduce tariffs. However, they resulted in public investment falling from 13% of 
GDP in 2005 to 8% of GDP in 2008, while private investment stagnated and the overall rate of 
investment in the country fell from 25% of GDP to 20% of GDP (Achcar, 2013, 45). Despite this, 
these neoliberal reforms created some economic gains which were captured almost entirely by 
Assad’s closer allies. Meanwhile, the majority of Syrians experienced these reforms in terms of 
rising unemployment and housing prices. Additionally, decreased tariffs left domestic 
manufacturing unable to compete with foreign imports, creating further poverty and 
unemployment (Hinnebusch, 2012; Noueihed & Warren, 2013). 
Politically, Bashar al-Assad alienated many rural areas in the years leading up to the 2011 
protests and civil war. Bashar’s father had invested heavily in rural areas, surrounded himself 
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with allies from the countryside, and enacted many popular subsidies. Bashar al-Assad lacked his 
father’s connection to the countryside, ended many of the subsidies, removed many of the rural 
old guard from power, and focused investment on urban centers. The result was a drop in 
agriculture as a percentage of GDP and higher levels of poverty in rural areas. For example, an 
average family in Damascus spent $773 per month in 2009 versus an average rural family which 
only spent $439. The percentage of income spent on food by the urban family was 35%, while 
the percentage spent but the rural family was 60% (Noueihed & Warren, 2013, 222).  
The evolution from protests, to civil war, to regional sectarian conflict was rapid and took 
place in an international context created by Arab Spring revolutions in Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya. 
Assad was advised on how best to respond to civil unrest by a committee put together to analyze 
the other Arab Spring revolutions. The committee found that the Tunisian and Egyptian regimes 
fell because they failed to crush the protests instantly, and recommended a policy of violent 
response to all protests (Heydemann, 2013a). Subsequently, in the rural town of Deraa several 
young boys were arrested for vandalism and tortured by security forces. The resulting protests 
were met with state sanctioned violence that killed several protestors. This in turn led to more 
protests, and more protestor deaths which sparked a viscous cycle that spread rapidly in rural 
areas and eventually reached urban centers. It is believed that protestors began arming 
themselves and organizing for protection very early on in this process. Armed protestors were 
soon complemented by defectors from the Syrian army who could not conscience killing their 
countrymen, and who had little incentive to follow orders to kill their ethnic kin that came from 
their minority leaders and officers. By early 2012, the situation in Syria had reached the point of 
civil war (Hinnebusch, 2012; Nepstad, 2013; Noueihed & Warren, 2013).  
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Motivations for Intervention in Syria  
 The motivations for states to undertake both supportive and hostile interventions in 
Syria’s civil war are a mix of instrumental and affective in nature. On the instrumental side, the 
outcome of Syria’s civil war will have a large effect on the regional balance of power. A rebel 
victory would likely result in the emergence of a Sunni regime, while a victory by the Assad 
regime will maintain the Alawite regime. This has important implications for the region, which is 
currently divided into two competing camps. On one side are the Shia actors: Iran, Iraq, Syria, 
and Hezbollah in Lebanon. They form an alliance that is fairly hostile to the west. In the other 
camp, there are the Sunni states comprised of Turkey, Saudi Arabia and the other Gulf 
Cooperation Council (GCC) states7 who are largely western aligned (Heydemann, 2013b; Ryan, 
2012). In addition to this roughly bipolar configuration, Russia is a longtime ally of the Assad 
regime and the United States is a longtime adversary.  
 The Sunni block would benefit greatly from the fall of the Assad regime, and thus has 
incentive to intervene for instrumental reasons. This can be seen through the realist lens as the 
desire to gain new assets, namely a more favorable balance of power, through hostile 
intervention. This is the case because the emergence of a new Sunni state would weaken their 
regional rival, Iran, and create political space for Turkey and the GCC states to expand their 
influence. In addition to this, there was an affective component of the camp’s motivation to 
support their sectarian allies who were targeted by the Assad regime throughout the conflict 
(Khoury, 2013). While the relative importance of instrumental versus affective motivations can 
only be speculated on, the literature indicates that instrumental reasons likely had greater 
influence on policy makers.  
                                                          
7
 The GCC states are: Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates  
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The Shia camp’s instrumental and affective motivations to intervene directly mirror those 
of the Sunni camp. A regime victory in Syria would strength Iran’s position relative to Saudi 
Arabia and Turkey, and maintain unbroken chain of bordering Shia states that links Iran to 
Hezbollah in Lebanon by way of Iraq and Syria (Heydemann, 2013a). Seen through a realist lens, 
this represents a supportive intervention as a form balancing against the Sunni block to preserve 
a favorable balance of power created by a continuum of Shia states. Additionally, the Shia block 
also experiences the same affective motivation to aid their sectarian allies.  
 
Methods of Intervention in Syria 
 All three methods of intervention - military, economic, and passive and direct transfers -
have been employed by the actors intervening in Syria. Russia directly transfers money and 
weapons to Syria (Saul, 2014). Iran also directly transfers money and weapons in support of the 
Assad regime. In addition to transfers, Iran also has undertaken supportive military intervention 
by sending members of the Basij militia, and military advisors to aid Assad (Saul & Hafezi, 
2014). Hezbollah, as a non-state actor, does not cleanly fit into the literature on intervention. 
Hezbollah fighters are active as combatants in Syria, which can either be seen as a permissive 
transfer of fighters on behalf of Lebanon, or as a direct military intervention taken by a non-state 
actor (Kershner, 2014; Wimmen, 2013).  
 On the hostile intervention side, the US has continually escalated the degree of 
intervention it is willing to undertake in Syria. Initially, the US limited itself to economic 
intervention via sanctions, later adding non-lethal aid to rebels, and even later running covert 
programs to train rebel forces outside of Syria. Eventually, the US escalated its aid to transfers of 
weapons to moderate rebel groups, although this is thought to be done through a third party, 
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qualifying it as a permissive transfer (Bowman & Fordham, 2014). Turkey and the several GCC 
states, which includes Saudi Arabia, transfer weapons and money both passively and directly to 
rebel groups. In addition to this, they also allow fighters to migrate to Syria to fight the Assad 
regime, although this is a purely passive transfer (Chivers & Schmitt, 2013).  
 
Outcomes of Rival Interventions in Syria 
 The literature suggests that hostile interventions tend to result in longer and bloodier 
conflicts, whereas supportive interventions result in shortened hostilities (Pickering & Kisangani, 
2006). It logically follows that rival interventions that do not result in either the state or the 
rebels taking a clear advantage would also result in a longer, bloodier conflict. This is exactly 
what has happened in Syria. The numerous interventions prolonged the war by infusing money, 
fighters, and weapons into a situation where neither the rebels nor the regime could win outright, 
nor solidify an advantage that would force the other side to negotiate a conditional surrender. 
The situation on the ground today is strong evidence that the outcome produced by the rival 
interventions is intense and regionalized and sectarianized conflict. The literature of sectarianism 
and conflict suggests that the outcome of increased sectarian conflict is due to a positive 
feedback loop in the pathway to sectarian conflict. As discussed in the 2003 Iraq case study, 
extant sectarian violence in the conflict spiral stage causes sectarian identity to turn individuals 
into targets. This increases perceptions of fear, which causes sectarian conflict to become both 
the cause and consequence of every other stage of the pathway.  
Evidence for this positive feedback loop can be seen in Syria’s civil war which was 
initially characterized as a conflict between the Assad regime and the Sunni majority and other 
oppressed minority groups such as the Kurds (Totton, 2013). Over time, the conception that the 
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war was between the rebels and the regime shifted to a conception of the war being defined in 
sectarian terms, with the Assad regime representing only one of several sectarian enemies. 
Evidence for this conceptual shift can be found in the now constant infighting between extremist 
and more moderate rebel groups, as well as between rebel groups from different sects. Such 
infighting has claimed roughly 3300 lives between the start of 2014 and late February (Barnard 
& Saad, 2013; Holmes, 2014). This shift in conception is partially explained by the theory that in 
the conflict spiral stage, rival groups can easily lose track of their original goals, and instead find 
themselves enmeshed in a conflict based solely or mainly on animosity towards their rival 
(Kalyvas & Kocher, 2007).  
 
Under Which Circumstances Does Intervention Cause Sectarian Conflict  
By applying the literature review to the case studies on intervention in Levant from 1990 
to 2014, it is possible to determine several circumstances under which intervention will be more 
likely to exacerbate (existing) sectarian conflict. First, as a precondition there must be multiple 
sects or ethnicities inside the target state which explains why Afghanistan, a far more 
homogenous state than Iraq or Syria, was largely spared sectarian conflict in the decade after it 
experienced military intervention. With this precondition met, there are several circumstances 
which I conclude make sectarian conflict more likely after an intervention. First, hostile 
interventions and rival interventions result in or exacerbate sectarian conflict because they reduce 
the state’s capacity to provide security and other services. Poverty is also a circumstance that 
increases the likelihood of sectarian conflict, mainly by worsening perceptions of fear and 
increasing the utility gained from sectarian affiliation. Inequality and marginalization that are 
experienced along sectarian lines are other conditions that result in an increased likelihood of 
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sectarian conflict because salient sectarian grievances and negative sectarian sentiments are 
created.  Finally, the presence of ethnic entrepreneurs is a circumstance under which intervention 
makes sectarian conflict more likely because the entrepreneurs will have an ideal environment to 
stoke perceptions of fear to garner political support.  
 The literature argues and the case studies support the claim that hostile interventions, 
such as the ones targeting Iraq, are more likely to result in sectarian conflict. Rival interventions 
where neither the hostile nor the supportive camp can produce a significant advantage in the 
target state, such as the rival interventions in the Syrian case study, are likely to result in 
sectarian conflict by the same logic. This is essentially because hostile interventions result in a 
greater degree of state disruption. The more disrupted a state is, the more likely a situation of 
emerging anarchy will occur. As discussed above, emerging anarchy is a primary factor that 
increases perceptions of fear which fuels the pathway to sectarian conflict as a whole (Saikal, 
2000). The case study of Iraq post 2003 shows that hostile interventions that cause a great 
enough degree of state disruption create situations of emerging anarchy; the creation of political 
and security vacuums in Iraq are examples of this. Based on the ability of hostile interventions to 
drastically increase perceptions of fear, I conclude that hostile interventions (undertaken by the 
intervening state) are a primary exacerbating factor of sectarian conflict.   
 Poverty is strongly associated in the literature with a higher likelihood of conflict 
(Carment, James & Taydas, 2009; Carpenter, 2012; Koubi & Bohmelt, 2013; Murshed, 2010; 
Prasch, 2012). It is fairly intuitive that higher levels of poverty increases the likelihood of 
sectarian conflict; perceptions of fear for the future will be stronger among impoverished 
populations who will feel any economic shocks caused by an intervention more acutely. An 
impoverished state is weaker, which facilitates the emergence of anarchy. Finally, impoverished 
40 
 
individuals also gain more utility from sectarian identification because the poor have fewer 
alternatives other than sectarian mobilization to obtain services. Based on this, I believe poverty 
in the target state to be a circumstance under which intervention is more likely to produce 
sectarian conflict.  
 Another fairly intuitive circumstance that increases the likelihood of sectarian conflict is 
the presence of an extant violent conflict in a state that is the target of a hostile or rival 
intervention. Not only would the conflict result in degree of state disruption, in this circumstance 
the pathway to sectarian conflict would already be in motion because of increased perceptions of 
fear due to the conflict. This describes the situation in Syria prior to the rival interventions. 
Additionally, if the civil war in question is sectarian in nature it is already possible for a conflict 
spiral and positive feedback loop to have been created. Alternatively, even if the conflict in 
question is nonsectarian in nature, increased perceptions of fear would still incentivize sectarian 
identification and mobilization, thus keeping the potential for future sectarian conflict alive. 
Based on the inflammatory effect a preexisting conflict would have on the pathway to sectarian 
conflict, I believe that an extant civil conflict in the target state is a circumstance under which 
intervention is more likely to produce sectarian conflict.  
 A situation where one sect is politically or economically marginalized by a rival sect in 
the target state is another circumstance under which intervention will be more likely to cause or 
exacerbate sectarian conflict. Sectarian conflict is more likely under this condition because 
marginalization increases perceptions of fear for the future in the marginalized group and creates 
politically salient sectarian grievances. Marginalization leads to increased perceptions of fear 
when the marginalized group foresees a future of even greater marginalization and decreased 
opportunity and security. This was experienced by Shias under Saddam’s rule, and by Sunnis 
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under Maliki’s. Salient grievances exacerbate the pathway to sectarian conflict by producing 
negative sentiments regarding the rival sect and a strengthened sense of affinity for one’s own 
sect. These two outcomes fuel the pathway to sectarian conflict by increasing the speed and 
scope of the identification and mobilization stage, add increased aggravation to the security 
dilemma stage, and ultimately can cause more intense conflict in the conflict spiral stage. To 
expand the Iraqi example, 2014 has seen numerous retributive attacks against both sects for 
grievances built up under both Saddam’s and Maliki’s rule. Based on the effects of both 
increased perceptions of fear and grievances, I conclude that the presence of a marginalized 
sectarian group in the target state is a circumstance under which intervention makes sectarian 
conflict more likely.   
The final circumstance that I identify as increasing the likelihood of sectarian conflict 
after intervention is the presence of ethnic entrepreneurs. These are individuals who purposely 
exacerbate perceptions of fear, of sectarian rivals in particular, in order to build a political or 
social constituency. Ethnic entrepreneurs often legitimize and direct sectarian violence, 
contributing to the conflict spiral stage and helping create positive feedback loops inside the 
pathway. Ethnic entrepreneurs are particularly dangerous and influential after an intervention 
because they can prey on naturally heightened perceptions of fear and make use of the increased 
relevance of sectarian identity. Bashar al-Assad for example, has acted as an ethnic entrepreneur 
since 2011 by maintaining the loyalty of many of Syria’s minority groups with rhetoric 
predicting their marginalization and slaughter under a non-secular Sunni regime. Assad has used 
this rhetoric to convince minority groups to fight against rebel forces thus legitimizing and 
directing sectarian violence by controlling perceptions of fear (Noueihed & Warren, 2013). 
However, ethnic entrepreneurs do not need to be state leaders; they can exacerbate sectarian 
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relations at any level of society. Based on the ability of ethnic entrepreneurs to increase 
perceptions of fear and stoke violence I conclude that their presence in the target state is a 
circumstance under which intervention makes sectarian conflict more likely.  
 
Conclusion 
 Interventions that result in state failure or to a lesser degree state weakness are the most 
likely to result in sectarian conflict. The most important factor that contributes to this is the type 
of intervention: hostile interventions and balanced rival interventions are the most likely to cause 
substantial state disruption according to the literature and as evidenced in the case studies. The 
other factors identified in the literature and seen in the Levant that influence the degree of state 
disruption are the presence of: poverty, preexisting conflict, a marginalized sectarian group, and 
ethnic entrepreneurs in the target state. Ultimately, all of these circumstances function in the 
same way. They increase the speed and scope of the pathway to sectarian conflict by increasing 
perceptions of fear, incentivizing sectarian identification and mobilization, exacerbating the 
security dilemma, or fueling the conflict spiral and creating positive feedback loops to other 
stages in the pathway.   
 The three Levantine case studies provide strong evidence for this argument. The two 
interventions into Iraq in the 90s did not result in sectarian conflict, despite increasing 
perceptions of fear by causing a humanitarian crisis and destroying most of Iraq’s infrastructure. 
The reason for this is that the Iraqi state under Saddam’s regime was not weakened enough for 
the pathway to sectarian conflict to reach the identification and mobilization stage because there 
was little utility to be derived from sectarian affiliation that the state did not also provide. The 
third intervention targeting Iraq caused state failure and put the pathway into motion, 
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culminating in a sectarian civil war. The lesser circumstances of poverty, grievances caused by 
marginalization, and the operation of ethnic entrepreneurs can all also be seen as contributing to 
Iraq’s sectarian conflict.  
The Syrian case study also provides evidence that rival interventions resulting in state 
weakness and the lesser circumstances of manipulative leaders, powerful sectarian grievances, 
poverty, and a preexisting conflict all provide fuel for the pathway to sectarian conflict. However, 
the civil war in Syria has lasted longer and has claimed more lives than the civil war in Iraq. 
Determining why this is the case would be a valuable topic of further study.  
Another topic for further study is the emergence of the insurgent group Islamic State of 
Iraq and the Levant (ISIL). It is worth noting that an analysis of ISIL and their activities since 
2011 provides ample evidence that intervention that weakens states and creates grievances will 
result in increased sectarian conflict. Applying the pathway to sectarian conflict theory to the 
atrocities that ISIL has committed yields concerning results. Mass killings and ethnic cleansing 
committed by a Sunni group with high military capacity will result in massively increased 
perceptions of fear among Shi’ites and other minorities in the region. Ultimately, it is 
unsurprising that Shia and Kurdish militias are mobilizing in response, or that they have carried 
out revenge attacks against Sunni civilians (Hubbard, 2014). The only silver lining regarding 
ISIL and the situation in the region today is that the current US led military intervention is, for 
the first time, a supportive intervention in the Levant.  
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